Several arti cial intelligence architectures and systems based on \deep" models of a domain have been proposed, in particular for the diagnostic task. These systems have s e v eral advantages over traditional knowledge based systems, but they have a main limitation in their computational complexity. One of the ways to face this problem is to rely on a knowledge compilation phase, which produces knowledge that can be used more e ectively with respect to the original one.
Introduction
The development of knowledge-based systems based on a \deep" model of the domain is currently an important challenge in Arti cial Intelligence. Diagnostic problem solving has been one of the main tasks for the application of reasoning from rst principles 16, 3 0 , 1 4 ] such an approach a l l o wed researchers to solve many challenging problems, such as diagnosis of multiple and interacting faults and to provide formal de nitions of the notion of diagnosis in particular, two logical de nitions have been proposed, namely the consistency-based 19, 2 0 , 4 9 ] and the abductive one 8, 13, 4 6 ] (see also 11, 4 5 , 4 8 ] for a comparison), as well as probabilistic characterizations 43, 4 4 , 4 7 ] . Moreover, several applications based on the model-based paradigm have been and are currently being developed.
One of the main obstacles to a wider practical application of the model-based approach is its computational complexity. Model-based diagnosis, in fact, is intractable in the worst case: Bylander et al . 2] showed that multiple fault diagnosis is N P -complete and that there are a number of sources of this intractability, including the requirement of covering all symptoms, nding a parsimonious diagnosis, and the use of fault models Selman and Levesque showed that even simple forms of abduction are intractable 50] . Moreover, diagnosis is a cyclic process in which explanation of the current set of data, selection of measurements for discriminating among candidate explanations and acquisition of new data are repeated until a satisfactory solution is achieved according to a set of goals or to possible repair actions 27]. All such activities can be expensive from the computational point of view.
Several approaches have been proposed since the mid 80's to mitigate such computational problems on practical applications. Various approaches to the integration of heuristic knowledge within model-based diagnostic systems have been proposed starting from the seminal work in Casnet 58] and Abel 40] . For example, Check 57 ] exploits heuristic knowledge to focus causal reasoning, which is used to assemble multiple fault diagnoses and to provide explanations Gtd 53] uses heuristic knowledge for generating hypotheses while causal knowledge is used to debug and re ne such h ypotheses. Other researchers suggested the use of \caching" techniques: the solution computed using models are cached into some form of heuristics that can be used to solve similar problems in the future (see, e.g., the seminal ideas in 54]). More speci cally, some approaches used techniques which are similar to Explanation Based Learning 38, 2 2 ] (see, e.g., the work by Steels and van de Velde's 55] Fink 24], Pazzani 41] ) others are based on Case-Based R easoning 35] (see, e.g., Casey 36] ). Finally, knowledge compilation techniques have been advocated to derive heuristic knowledge (or heuristic problem solvers) from deep models (see the discussion in 4] and 1, 33, 39, 4 2 , 51]) compiled knowledge is in some cases used in conjunction with the deep model (as in mdx- 2 56] in which compiled knowledge is used at rst and a deep functional models is invoked when the heuristic one fails).
Several researchers, since the early work in Abel 40] and Dart 28] , suggested that complexity can be controlled by using hierarchical models of the system to be diagnosed. The idea is that one can rst isolate fault(s) in an abstract model and then re ne such solutions by considering only the relevant parts of detailed models (see e.g., 39, 5 2 ] ).
All of the approaches mentioned above are based, in some way, on the use of multiple models of the system to be diagnosed. However, the use of multiple models has some drawbacks: rst of all, the di erent models have to be acquired (worsening in most cases the already di cult knowledge acquisition task) and, most importantly, their consistency must be guaranteed (see, to this purpose, the discussion in 39]). This is one of the reasons why in many of such approaches the use of learning techniques has been advocated.
An alternative to the use of multiple models is the adoption of \internal" focusing techniques, i.e. techniques that try to direct and focus the diagnostic procedure. A r s t possibility is to limit the attention to special classes of solutions such as single faults (neglecting the possibility o f h a ving more than one fault at a time) or solutions that involve at most a given number N of faults (see, e.g., 23]). A more general approach is based on fault probabilities which allow the diagnostic process to consider only a limited set of leading (most probable) diagnoses, ignoring all the rest of the space of solutions. Such an idea has been successfully used in Gde 18 ] a n d Sherlock 21] , where not only is probablistic information used for focusing the generation of explanations but also for the selection of discriminatory measurements. This is important since also such a phase can be computationally expensive however, the limitation of the approach is that the two phases are kept separated (while in some cases it could be useful to discriminate between two partial solutions very early, that is before they are both completely built).
A last group of approaches to \internal" focusing is based on the decomposition of a problem into subproblems that can be diagnosed independently (and thus they should be easier to solve than the original one). For example, 26] exploits structural knowledge for isolating parts of a device that can be diagnosed independently.
In this paper we propose an approach to focusing abductive diagnosis which is an alternative to those discussed above (notice that the problem is intrinsically intractable and thus our approach, as well as those discussed above only aims at having algorithms that work e ciently on practically cases, the worst case remains intractable). The main aim of our approach i s at focusing the overall diagnostic cycle, trying also to interleave the generation of explanations and measurement selection. More speci cally, we consider the abductive c haracterization of diagnosis in 11] and we suggest an approach, based on the a-priori compilation of operational knowledge from the model, to focus the search for solutions of abduction problems (a preliminary discussion of the approach w as presented in 6]). The goal of our focusing strategy is twofold:
1. Avoiding the construction of solutions that would be rejected a posteriori in particular:
1.1.solutions that can be pruned because they are inconsistent with data 1.2.redundant solutions.
Notice that the completeness of the solution process is maintained even if such solutions are excluded.
2. Interleaving explanation and selection of discriminatory measurements. The goal is to ask data during the generation of explanations in such a w ay that competing explanations can be discriminated as early as possible (before completely building them).
We show that the use of di erent types of compiled knowledge allows the achievement of such goals: necessary conditions associated with the entities in the model provide the pruning power (item 1.1), su cient conditions provide the ability o f a voiding the construction of redundant explanations (item 1.2) the use of such conditions also allows us to perform at least a partial discrimination of explanations during their construction, with a reasonable number of additional measurements (item 2). The conditions and the decisions that are made when they are evaluated embed the problem solving strategy for abductive diagnosis. In order to provide advantages, such conditions must be e cient t o e v aluate and must thus be formed by terms which concern data that are typically known when a diagnostic problem is solved (they must be operational 32], in the Explanation Based Learning terminology).
The paper is thus also a contribution to the discussion on the usefulness of knowledge compilation in model-based reasoning 4, 15, 29, 34] . In this sense it departs from previous approaches and signi cantly extends previous work in 12]. While 12] concentrated on the automatic synthesis of operational knowledge (necessary conditions only) from a model giving a avour of the possible uses of such k n o wledge, this paper introduces a more comprehensive approach making use of di erent t ypes of compiled conditions to optimize a speci c diagnostic reasoning strategy and focusing the overall diagnostic cycle (including discrimination).
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 sketches the abductive c haracterization of model-based diagnosis in 11] and points out the sources of complexity in the solution of diagnostic problems section 3 introduces the notion of operational conditions section 4 shows how such conditions can be used for focusing abductive reasoning, reporting experimental results relative to the integration of the technique into the Aid architecture (Abductive and Iterative Diagnosis) 7] section 5 outlines how operational conditions can be automatically synthesized from the model of the system to be diagnosed section 6 compares our approach to related ones.
An abductive approach to diagnosis
In this section we brie y outline the abductive approach to model-based diagnosis proposed in 11]. It is a general one (among logical approaches) since it includes, as special cases, a purely consistency-based de nition of model-based diagnosis and a purely abductive one.
Behavioral models
The starting point of our approach is a logical description of the faulty and/or correct behavior of a physical system by means of a set of states (denoting either normal or abnormal situations in the modeled system). The formalism includes four di erent t ypes of entities, corresponding to four types of symbols: initial state symbols, corresponding to states which h a ve no causes in the model (and in terms of which the solutions of a diagnostic problem have t o b e p r o vided) context symbols, corresponding to conditions on which the evolution of the system depends manifestation (or observable state) symbols, corresponding to conditions which can be directly observed or measured internal state symbols, which, on the other hand, correspond to conditions which are not directly measurable (observable).
Each entity is characterized by a set of attributes (which in the logical language are the arguments of the predicate symbol corresponding to the entity). In the following we shall assume that each e n tity has only one attribute (from the theoretical point of view this is not restrictive) and we shall refer to the value of such attribute as the value of the entity.
A behavioral model is a set of de nite clauses of the form: is the body of the clause. We impose that each S i in the body is either an internal state or an initial state symbol, each C j is a context symbol and S can be either an internal state or a manifestation symbol. The function f de nes the mapping between the values of S 1 , : : : , S n , C 1 , : : : C m and the value of S. Informally, w e shall read a clause as a cause-e ect relationship, i.e., \S 1 (X 1 ) and : : : and S n (X n ) (directly) cause S(f(X 1 : : : X n Y 1 : : : Y m )) in the context formed by C 1 (Y 1 ) a n d : : : and C m (Y m )". Notice that in case S is the head of more than one clause, then such clauses correspond to alternative causes of S. In case S is a manifestation symbol, it is also possible to read the clause as \S(f(X 1 : : : X n Y 1 : : : Y m )) is a manifestation of S 1 (X 1 ) and : : : and S n (X n ) in the context formed by C 1 (Y 1 ) and : : : and C m (Y m )".
We impose the constraint that the set of clauses de ning a behavioral model must contain no cycles: i.e., a state S cannot be a (direct or indirect) cause of itself from the logical point of view, the dependency graph of the set of clauses must be acyclic (the dependency graph of a set of clauses is the digraph having the predicates as nodes and an arc from p to q if and only if p occurs in the body of a clause in whose head q occurs). This is certainly a major restriction on the expressive p o wer of the language since cyclic processes cannot be modeled. It is important to notice, however, that in the paper we abstract from the temporal dimension of causal models (this is a common limitation of many approaches to model-based diagnosis) a general treatment of cyclic processes can be provided only if the temporal dimension is explicitly modeled.
When complex domains are modeled, the assumption that complete models can be built is not realistic 8]. A further class of symbols, the abstracted condition symbols, is thus introduced to explicitly represent i t wo forms of incompleteness in a behavioral model:
incompleteness of a relation the relationship between the states S 1 , : : : S n and S (in the context formed by C 1 : : : C m ) may b e partially speci ed, i.e. some conditions (other causes or contextual conditions) are not speci ed (for example, because they cannot be speci ed at the level of abstraction of the model). In such a case, the incompleteness is modeled by adding to the body of the rule an abstracted condition atom denoting the actual condition abstracted in the model: In the following we shall denote as the set of abducible symbols the union of the sets of the initial state and abstracted condition symbols. Abducible symbols correspond to the conditions in terms of which explanations have to be provided, i.e. conditions that can be assumed in the solution of a diagnostic problem. The rst clause, with an appropriate de nition of f 1 , represents the relation \a lack of oil in the context of a high external temperature causes an increase of the engine temperature" the second rule, with an appropriate de nition of f 2 , represents the relation \if the engine mileage is high then it may be the case that the piston rings are worn".
Diagnosis as an abductive process
Given a behavioral model, a diagnostic problems is characterized by a set of data, among which contextual data (which p r o vide contextual information about the problem to be solved and that need not be explained) and observations (that must be explained) are distinguished.
De nition 1 A diagnostic problem DP is a triple DP=hT, C X T , i, w h e r e:
-T is a behavioral model -is a set of ground manifestation atoms denoting the set of observations.
For the sake of simplicity in the declarative de nitions in this subsection we shall assume that C X T contains exactly one instance of each c o n text node (so that all relevant c o n textual data are known a-priori) and that contains at most one instance of each manifestation. This is reasonable since we abstract from time. The manifestations not occurring in can be regarded as unknown.
Diagnostic problems can be reformulated as abduction problems with consistency constraints 11]. De nition 2 Given a diagnostic problem DP=hT, C X T , i, a n abduction problem AP corresponding to DP is a triple AP=hT Solving an abduction problem corresponds to determining a set of abducibles which explains the observations in the given context, i.e., it entails + consistently with ; :
De nition 3 Given an abduction problem AP=hT, C X T , h + , ; ii, a set E of abducible atoms (containing at most one instance o f e ach abducible symbol) is an explanation for AP i :
, that is for each m 2 + , T C X T E`m (2) E is consistent with ; , t h a t i s f o r e ach :m 2 ; , T C X T E 6 m. Consistency with ; corresponds to not predicting any atom con icting with the observations (this is the same notion used in consistency-based approaches to diagnosis). E can also be regarded as the solution of the diagnostic problem DP having AP as a reformulation. Notice that a diagnostic problem has di erent sets of solutions according to di erent reformulations as an abduction problem (see 11]). The constraint that E can contain at most one instance of each abducible symbol is again due to the fact that we abstract from time.
In general, an abduction problem AP has more than one solution and thus some parsimony criteria to select preferred ones are needed. As it is common in abductive reasoning, we prefer the explanations containing minimal sets (with respect to set inclusion) of abducibles (minimal explanations), i.e., those whose subsets are not in turn explanations. This corresponds to avoiding redundant assumptions.
Example
As an example from the model illustrated in gure 1, consider a diagnostic problem DP 1 with the following set of observations:
Since only the faulty behavior is explicitly modeled, we can explain abductively only observations corresponding to abnormal conditions (only acceler response(delayed) in the example). We t h us have the abduction problem AP 1 characterized by: There is only one explanation E 1 = f spark plugs mileage(more than 20000 km), 7 g for AP 1 the assumptions 7 corresponds to the MAY arc connecting spark plugs used up and spark ignition. All the other sets of abducibles entailing + lead to inconsistency with ; . The part of causal knowledge contributing to the solution is the following: if the spark plugs have a high mileage then they are used up and this may cause (and indeed causes in this case) problems to the ignition and thus a delayed response of the accelerator.
Computing explanations
The de nition in the previous section concentrates on declarative issues. From a procedural point of view, an abduction problem is solved iteratively: given initial data (in general a small set of contextual data and observations), candidate hypotheses explaining such data are generated, then further data are required for discriminating among the candidates. The following abstract procedure, which has been implemented in the Aid architecture 7], can be adopted: hinitial data acquisition: collect initial data characterizing the speci c problemi hdetermine the explanations for the current set of datai while hdiscrimination needed or wantedi do hdisplay the current explanations with their corresponding predictions on unobserved datai hsuggest which is the observable parameter that provides the \best" discrimination among the competing explanationsi hacquire new datai hupdate the set of explanations by taking into account the new observation(s)i endwhile houtput the nal set of explanationsi Let us consider more precisely the main parts of such a procedure. First of all, de ning the halting condition can be di cult. Obviously one must stop when there is only one candidate or when the candidates cannot be further discriminated. In other cases, interaction with the user or with knowledge about the purpose of the system to be diagnosed or about repair strategies is needed 27].
The concrete algorithm we adopted for determining the explanations is formed by t wo i n teracting processes:
1. a process which m o ves backward from the atoms in + towards their causes and which determines the minimal sets of abducibles that imply such atoms 2. a process that checks the consistency of such candidates, verifying whether they predict some values con icting with the observations, i.e. atoms inconsistent with the literals in ; .
The former may be ine cient since it might explore many alternative causes, some of which m a y result in useless search since they lead to abducibles which are inconsistent with the observations. The latter is critical from the computational point of view since signi cant parts of a model might h a ve to be analyzed in order to check the consistency of even a limited set of abducibles. De ning good general strategies for the co-operation of the two processes is di cult since a trade-o must be considered. On the one hand, inconsistent candidates should be rejected as early as possible and thus, in order to look for inconsistencies, one should not wait until a candidate solution has been completely determined. On the other hand, one cannot check consistency too often because this can be very expensive. In some cases, moreover, the inconsistency can be detected only after the candidate has been completely assembled (i.e., none of its proper subsets is inconsistent with the observations) this seems to be the worst case that makes abduction intractable.
In order to make the discussion clearer, let us consider the example in section 2.2.1. Backward search starts from acceler response(delayed) which is the only observation to be covered. There are two alternative causes: engine temp(much increased) and spark ignition(irregular). Moving backward from the rst one there are two alternative causes of lack of oil(severe) to be analyzed (moreover, the system asks the user whether the ext temperature is high let us assume that this is the case) one leads to assuming road condition(poor) the other to assuming engine mileage(high). However, all the search on the causes of engine temp(much increased) is useless since all the candidate explanations that are built predict (steam(present)) which is a consequence of engine temp(much increased). The same problem arises when searching for the causes of spark ignition(irregular) for example, all the alternative candidate explanations for electrical power(low) have to be discarded since they are inconsistent with the fact that the lights are normal. Since no value for short circuit and rainis related to spark ignition(irregular), only the solution mentioned above ( f spark plugs mileage(more than 20000 km), 7 g) is found.
The selection of the most discriminating measurement can be done with the approach in 9], based on information theoretic concepts and heuristics (the approach is similar to the one used by de Kleer et al. in consistency based diagnosis 17, 20] ). The choice is based on the predictions of candidate explanations on unknown manifestations, plus some rough estimate of the a-priori probabilities of the abducibles 1 , plus some heuristics to determine the posterior probability of each candidates given the alternative v alues of the unknown manifestations. If there are several candidate explanations, the approach can be expensive, since the candidate explanations have to be generated, the predictions of all candidates have to be considered and many a-posteriori distributions have t o be computed. It would be interesting to ask information about unknown manifestations in the process that generates abductive explanations, especially in case the selection of the measurement can be done quickly, e v en if the selected measurement is not necessarily an optimal one (since it is selected on the basis of a local discriminatory power rather than on a global one).
The next three sections discuss how compiled knowledge can be used to focus the search for explanations and can guide the request for further data, at least for those data that can be easily observed, so that it is sensible to interleave their acquisition with the generation of explanations. This does not exclude the use of measurement selection for global discrimination (possibly using data that are di cult to acquire) however, the focusing techniques reduce the set of candidates to be further discriminated.
Operational knowledge
This section introduces the types of operational knowledge that will be used to focus the solution of an abduction problem. In particular, there are two i n teracting goals outlined in the introduction:
1. Reducing the search space, avoiding the construction of candidate explanations which w ould be rejected a-posteriori (in such a w ay the completeness of the solution procedure is maintained):
1.1.avoiding, for the explanation of + , the exploration of branches which w ould only provide sets of assumptions that are inconsistent with ; 1.2.avoiding the exploration of branches that would only provide redundant explanations (i.e., explanations containing unnecessary assumptions).
2. Asking information to the user (as little information as possible) to enlarge + and ; during the diagnostic process, in order to achieve the goals of item 1 above. In this way discrimination among competing candidates can be performed during their construction (rather than a-posteriori).
Necessary conditions for the states in the model are used as rule-out knowledge, to achieve the goal of item 1.1: states whose necessary conditions are inconsistent with data characterizing the diagnostic problem to be solved can be removed from the search space. The use of su cient conditions associated with states is a way to achieve the goal of item 1.2. Su cient conditions are used in a local way, to focus the solution of part of a diagnostic problem, i.e. to state that some assumption A is necessarily part of the solution (i.e. it is part of all the solutions). We believe that su cient conditions are of limited use when adopted to provide the whole solution of a diagnostic problem, i.e. to de nitely state that the solution is a set E of assumptions (we shall return to this in section 6). The combined use of necessary conditions and su cient conditions allows us to achieve goal 2.
In order to be useful in practice, necessary and su cient conditions must be easily evaluable. Using a terminology borrowed from Explanation Based Learning 38, 2 2 ], the conditions must be operational 32]. A natural way to de ne operationality in behavioral models is to rely on the observability of manifestations and contextual parameters (which will be denoted in the following as observable symbols).
De nition 4 A l o gical formula F is operational i all the atomic formulae occurring in it are g r ound and their predicate symbols are observable.
An operational formula is then a logical condition on observable entities in our formalism. In the following we shall limit to operational formulae that contain only the^and _ connectives. The notion of operationality could be further re ned, singling out a subclass of context and manifestation symbols corresponding to conditions that are easy to observe.
Necessary conditions
The notion of necessary condition for a ground state atom S(a) is de ned as follows.
De nition 5 Given a behavioral model T, a l o gical formula N C S(a) is a necessary condition for S(a) i for any set C of context atoms and any set E of abducible atoms, if T C E`S(a) then T C EǸ C S(a) .
This means that N C S(a) is true in every explanation of S(a) (given any set of context atoms). As an example, a necessary condition for engine temp(much increased) is the following:
( ( hole in oil sump(present)^ground clearance(low))_ ( exhaust smoke(black)^( state of pistons(veryworn)_ piston rings state(veryworn))))
The condition contains manifestations which a r e :
necessary consequences of the state engine temp(much increased), i.e. manifestation of the state itself (acceler response(delayed)) or manifestations of states which necessarily follow from it (e.g., high temp indicator(red)) notice that MAY consequences (seizure(present)) are not considered contextual conditions on causes of engine temp(much increased), i.e., ext temperature(high), which i s the contextual condition on the only arc causing the state necessary consequences of causes of the state engine temp(much increased), e.g., oil warning light(red)
notice that disjunctions correspond to alternative causes.
The relevant property of necessary conditions is that a state S(a) can be pruned when its necessary condition N C S(a) is inconsistent with data. If C X T ; is the set of values for contextual data con icting with the observed values (in the same way as for ; ), i.e., C X T ; =f:c(x) / c(y)2C X T , for each admissible value x of c other than yg, then an operational necessary condition F is inconsistent with the data if and only if F ; C X T ; is inconsistent in the logical sense. The following property holds.
Property 1 Given an abduction problem AP=hT, C X T , h + , ; ii, a g r ound atom S(a) and an operational necessary condition N C S(a) for S(a), if N C S(a) is inconsistent with the data characterizing AP (that is, N C S(a) ; C X T ; is inconsistent in the logical sense) then there is no explanation E for AP such that
T C X T E`S(a).
This follows from the de nition of explanation and from the de nition of necessary condition. Intuitively, given a ground atom S(a) (an instance of a state S), any s e t E of assumptions that entails S(a) also entails N C S(a) and is thus inconsistent with the observations. Therefore E cannot be an explanation thus S(a) cannot be involved in any explanation of the observations. Necessary conditions can thus be used for pruning the search space: in the case above S(a) (and all of its causes) can be pruned without loosing any solution.
In general, more than one operational necessary condition can be associated with each e n tity in a behavioral model. In the example, an alternative necessary condition for the state engine temp(much increased), other than N C 1 above, is:
From a theoretical point of view, the most interesting formula is the most speci c one, i.e., the one that implies all the others (N C 1 in the example above). Such a formula, in fact, is the one having the highest potential for pruning. However, the more speci c a formula is, the higher is the time required to check whether it is inconsistent with data. Thus there is an important trade-o to be considered 2 similar to that of choosing which conditions are operational we shall return in section 4.1.3 to this point.
Su cient conditions
The notion of su cient condition is dual with respect to the notion of necessary condition.
De nition 6 Given a behavioral model T, a logical formula S C S(a) is a su cient condition for S(a) i for any set C of context atoms and any set E of abducible atoms, if T C E`S C S(a) then T C ES (a).
Such conditions can be used to avoid exploring parts of the search space that would lead to redundant explanations. Consider a state S having multiple causes such that, for example, the atom S(a) is caused by S 1 (a 1 ) or S 2 (a 2 ). If a su cient condition associated with one of such states (say S 1 (a 1 )) is true on the available data, search can be avoided on further causes of the other state (S 2 (a 2 )). In fact, S 1 (a 1 ) is true in the case under examination and this su ces to explain S(a) therefore, making assumptions that lead to the explanation to S 2 (a 2 ) w ould be redundant (unless they are actually needed for explaining some manifestation M di erent from the one that led to S but in that case such assumptions will be made to explain M).
Such a use of su cient conditions requires that they only contain manifestation atoms that would be put in + , if observed. Therefore, the same criterion that is used for forming + from should be adopted for including manifestations in su cient conditions.
As an example, a su cient condition associated with engine temp(much increased) is the following: S C 1 high temp indicator(red) _ steam (present) Suppose that in a diagnostic problem the manifestation acceler response(delayed) has to be explained and that also high temp indicator(red) has been observed acceler response(delayed) h a s t wo alternative causes that in principle should be explored however, since the evaluation of S C 1 shows that engine temp(much increased) must be true, avoiding the explanation of acceler response(delayed) with spark ignition(irregular) w ould not lead to loosing any minimal explanation. However, spark ignition(irregular) will actually be considered if engine starting(difficult) is also observed.
Completion
We can analyze the notions of necessary and su cient condition also from a di erent point of view, given that the de nition of abduction adopted in model-based diagnosis (de nition 3) can be regarded as deduction on Given such a c haracterization it is possible to state the following property w h i c h g i v es an alternative, more explicit characterization of the notions of necessary condition and su cient condition.
Property 2 Given a behavioral model T:
N C S(a) i s a n e cessary condition for S(a) i T C j= S(a) ! N C S(a) S C S(a) is a su cient condition for S(a) i T C j= S C S(a) ! S(a).
The formula S(a) ! N C S(a) expresses the fact that N C S(a) is a necessary condition for the presence of S(a) and can be used, by c o n traposition, to conclude :S(a) (i.e., to prune S(a) f r o m t h e s e a r c h space) each time N C S(a) is inconsistent with data. Notice that if N C S(a) is a necessary condition for S(a), it is not necessarily true that T j= S(a) ! N C S(a) , i.e. the completion is needed in order to derive S(a) ! N C S(a) in fact, the necessary condition N C S(a) may mention necessary consequences of causes of S(a). In the simple example above, c is a necessary condition for d, but it is not the case that T j= d ! c, w h i l e T C j= d ! c. This is because the completion embeds abductive reasoning: if d has to be explained, then b has to be assumed, and c must be true but deductive reasoning on T does not require this, since T does not imply d ! b.
Similar considerations hold for the formula S C S(a) ! S(a) which expresses the fact that S C S(a) is a su cient condition for S(a).
Focusing with necessary conditions and su cient conditions
In this section we analyze how necessary and su cient conditions can actually be used to focus the abduction process, pruning the search space and guiding the request of data. Moreover, we report some empirical results we obtained adding compiled conditions as the focusing component of the Aid architecture.
Using necessary conditions for pruning the search space
In order to show h o w necessary conditions can be used to prune the search space, it is necessary to make clear three aspects:
1. which are the atoms with which necessary conditions are associated 2. when are these conditions evaluated 3. which conditions are used.
As regards item 1, necessary conditions are associated with manifestations and a subset of state atoms (we shall be more precise later on).
Conditions on manifestations
As regards items 2 and 3, a rst issue to be discussed is when the conditions associated with manifestation atoms are evaluated. An abduction problem is characterized by a set The use of necessary conditions associated with manifestations can reduce the set of elements from which backward search has to be performed. Consider a manifestation A such that another manifestation B is necessary for A. In such a case looking for an explanation of A is su cient B will be explained as a \side e ect". In fact, the following property holds.
Property 3 Given an abduction problem AP=hT, C X T , h + , ; ii, and given two members A and B of + , i f B is a necessary condition for A, then AP 0 =hT , C X T , h + n f Bg, ; ii has the same explanations as AP.
The importance of this property stems form the fact that reducing the set of manifestations from which backward search has to be performed may provide a signi cant advantage. In fact, in case B is a necessary condition for A, i t i s c o n venient to remove B from the seto of observations to be explained since the explicit explanation of B would only lead to redundant work: given a minimal explanation E A of A, consider the union of E A with minimal explanations of B:
At least one minimal explanation of B is a subset of E A in fact, E A explains B and therefore is a superset of some minimal explanation of B. In this case the result of the union is just E A .
For all the explanations E B of B which are not subsets of E A , E A E B E A .
In any case the union operation will provide some (proper or improper) superset of E A . Therefore, at least 
Conditions on states
Let us now discuss how necessary conditions associated with \state" atoms are used this concerns all items 1, 2 a n d 3 a b o ve, imposing some constraints on how such conditions should be generated. In principle, during the backward process one could evaluate the necessary conditions associated with each state and prune those states (and their causes) for which the necessary condition is inconsistent. In practice, the evaluation of necessary conditions is useful in backward search only when a choice p oint is encountered, i.e. a ground manifestation or internal state atom having multiple direct causes (according to the informal terminology introduced in section 2.1).
Given a choice point S, the necessary conditions associated with its alternative causes can be evaluated (if the cause is a conjunction, the necessary condition associated with it is the conjunction of the conditions associated with its elements). If the condition associated with one of the alternatives, say S 0 , is inconsistent with data, then S 0 can be excluded, thus possibly avoiding a lot of search: in fact, it is possible that either an observable consequence of a remote cause of S 0 is inconsistent with data or a manifestation of some consequence of S 0 is inconsistent with data. The necessary conditions associated with the states can immediately point o u t the inconsistency and thus search is compiled in the evaluation of such conditions.
Under reasonable assumptions on the generation of conditions (assumptions that will be met in section 5), the following argument shows that if a state S is not a choice point, i.e. it has a unique possible (atomic or composite) cause S 0 , then it is not useful to evaluate the necessary condition N C S 0 associated with S 0 . In fact, N C S 0 should be the same as the condition associated with S since S has been reached during backward search, there are two cases to be considered:
If S has been reached from some manifestation M without encountering any c hoice point, the condition N C M associated with M should imply the condition N C S associated with S t h us:
if N C M is consistent, also N C S is consistent if N C M is inconsistent, there is no solution for the problem, since any explanation of M is inconsistent.
Otherwise, consider the last choice point S 00 encountered before arriving to S. As above, the condition N C S 00 associated with S 00 should imply N C S since the consistency of N C S 00 has been checked before proceeding, it is also known that N C S is consistent.
Therefore N C S 0 is consistent, unless there is no solution for the abduction problem, in which case the necessary condition associated with some member of + is inconsistent. Then it is possible to deal with such a case by checking the consistency of all the conditions associated with manifestations in + before starting backward search. However, a trade-o should be considered: if the possibility o f h a ving no solution is considered highly improbable (for example, because the knowledge base has been extensively tested), the overhead of such an initial check can be avoided at the price of loosing time in case the improbable event actually happens. Thus, we can conclude that it is not convenient t o e v aluate N C S 0 i n a n y case, the set of solutions is not a ected by the choice.
The form of necessary conditions
A nal important problem to be discussed concerns the form of necessary conditions, since there is more than one necessary condition for a state.
Consider a choice point S having two causes S 1 and S 2 the necessary conditions associated with S 1 and S 2 are evaluated in the backward process to determine an explanation for S. Since S has been reached during backward search from some M 2 + , for the same reasons discussed above we already know that the consequences of S are not inconsistent with data (unless in case the condition associated with M is inconsistent and the initial check of such a condition has been avoided). Therefore in the necessary conditions associated with S 1 and S 2 we can limit to considering on the one hand their causes and on the other hand their consequences other than S. This means that for each state it is appropriate to use di erent necessary conditions depending on the situation in which such conditions have to be used (or, better, that the necessary conditions are associated with the arcs entering a choice point).
Apart from the simpli cation above which does not a ect the pruning power of a condition, one can also consider simpli ed syntactic forms that make the evaluation of necessary conditions more e cient ( e v en if the pruning power is reduced, at least in principle this is an instance of the trade-o mentioned in section 3). We c hoose, in particular, to impose that necessary conditions must be conjunctions (so that the falsity o f a single element of the conjunction implies the falsity of the condition). In particular, consider a state S 0 which is (part of) one of the direct causes of a choice point S. The necessary condition to be evaluated when S 0 is used to explain S will not contain, for the reasons discussed above, necessary operational consequences of S, and if S 0 (or one of its causes) has several alternative causes, the disjunction of the conditions associated with such causes is not associated with S 0 . This does not mean that such manifestations are never considered but simply that they will be considered if and when such alternative paths will be explored.
Consider for example engine temp(much increased) as a possible explanation of the choice point acceler response(delayed) some necessary conditions for it have been shown in section 3.1. Limiting to conditions in the form of conjunctions means limiting to the following condition: N C 3 high temp indicator(red)^steam(present)^ext temperature(high)^oil warning light(red)
With respect to the most speci c formula N C 1 shown in section 3.1, acceler response(delayed) is not considered, since N C 3 is going to be used when acceler response(delayed) has to be explained. The rest of the most speci c formula is the disjunction: N C 4 This is an instance of the trade-o mentioned in section 3 about the speci city of conditions. However, the situation above ( N C 4 is inconsistent while N C 3 is not) is rather unlikely, also because it is often the case that few pieces of information are available at the beginning of the diagnostic process. This introduces another issue to be discussed: during the evaluation of necessary conditions it may be the case that some manifestation (or context) atom m(a) occurring in a condition is unknown, in the sense that no value has been yet observed for m (i.e. there is no instance of m in and then there is none in + nor in ; ).
Asking data for evaluating necessary conditions
In order to be able to evaluate compiled conditions, the values of unknown operational parameters could be asked to the user. A rst choice is the following (we shall return in section 4.2 to more sophisticated approaches taking into account a l s o s u c i e n t conditions): a special class of \easy to observe" data is singled out in the model (including, usually, contextual data and manifestations corresponding to easily accessible parameters). The notion of operationality, a s a n ticipated in section 3, can then be restricted to such a subclass of observable conditions. The following optimization can then be adopted to exploit necessary conditions.
Optimization 2 If a choice p oint is reached during backward s e arch, the necessary conditions associated with its causes are evaluated, and causes whose necessary conditions are inconsistent are discarded. If an unknown atom m(a) occurs in a necessary condition N C , the observed value of m is asked to the user if both of the following conditions hold:
there is not enough information to state that N C is inconsistent it is not the case that m(a) is a necessary condition for some atom in + in this case, in fact, m(a) must necessarily be true, unless there is no solution for the problem.
Data acquired during such an evaluation are included i n , thus enlarging + and ; .
The last part of the optimization deserves some comments. It means, in particular, that newly acquired data that should be explained abductively have to be included in + . This means that all the candidate explanations that are being built should take i n to account the new observations to be explained abductively (as well as the new members of ; for consistency checking). This is not trivial, in general. Consider the following example ( gure 2 is an instance of this example).
Suppose a choice point s has two direct causes s 1 and s 2 , with necessary conditions N C s1 and N C s2 , and during the evaluation of N C s1 the new datum m which occurs in it is acquired, where m is an observation to be put in + . Since N C s1 is a conjunction and m occurs in it, m is a necessary condition for s 1 , and therefore it is automatically explained by a n y explanation of s 1 . As anticipated in section 3.2, if m is also a su cient condition for s 1 , t h e n s 2 can be discarded as an explanation of s. However, if m is a necessary but not su cient condition for s 1 , then s 2 must not be discarded in fact, it is possible that some explanation of s 2 (fa 2 g in gure 2), possibly enlarged with additional assumptions (a 3 in gure 2), provides a minimal explanation of m which d o e s n o t i n volve s 1 , and is thus di erent from explanations of s found using s 1 . A further optimization, possibly involving su cient conditions, can be adopted to avoid querying the user in some case. If it is known that a choice point S is necessarily true for solving the problem, and all but one cause S 0 for S have been discarded, it is sensible to avoid evaluating conditions associated with S 0 (and thus asking data), since S 0 is the last chance to explain S, so it is necessarily true unless there is no solution for the problem. If this case is considered unlikely (see section 4.1.2), the following optimization can be adopted.
Optimization 4 If a su cient condition for a state S is true (or, in particular, if S is observed), S is labeled a s necessarily true. If a choice p oint S is necessarily true and all but one of its causes S 0 have been discarded, the conditions associated with S 0 are not evaluated, and S 0 is labeled a s n e cessarily true. If a state S is necessarily true and it has only one cause S 0 , then S 0 is labeled a s n e cessarily true.
This optimization can also be applied if su cient conditions are not used, relying, as a start point, on the particular case where S is observed.
The syntactic form adopted for su cient conditions to be associated with atoms is a disjunction of operational atoms, since, if each of the observable atoms o 1 : : : o n is a su cient condition for a state S, then o 1 _ : : : _ o n is also a su cient condition for S. A possible choice is to limit to those observable atoms that occur also in the necessary condition for S. This is especially useful when data have t o b e a s k ed to the user in order to evaluate the conditions: if o occurs in both the necessary and the su cient condition for S, asking o will provide some focusing in any case, either falsifying the necessary condition or making the su cient c o ndition true. This produces a more sophisticated data acquisition strategy with respect to the one presented in section 4.1. It is also possible to have a still more sophisticated strategy that further integrates generation and discrimination of explanations. In case the conditions associated with di erent alternative explanations of a choice point cannot be evaluated with the available data, the optimal strategy is to ask a datum that occurs with di erent v alues in the di erent conditions (if there is one): this ensures that at least one of the alternatives can be pruned when such a v alue is known.
An example
Let us reconsider the example in section 2.2.1 and discuss how compiled knowledge can be used to speed up reasoning in such a case. A v ariation of the example will also be considered in which data has to be asked in order to evaluate the compiled conditions. The following data are considered easy to observe:
acceler response engine starting exhaust smoke ext temperature ground clearance high temp indicator lights oil warning light steam stuck engine
Since acceler response(delayed) is the only nding to be covered, backward search is started from it. In particular, since it is a manifestation of more than one state, the necessary conditions associated with such states when searching backward from acceler response(delayed) are evaluated:
the necessary condition associated with engine temp(much increased) we have that N C 3 is inconsistent with the data and thus all the search space concerning the causes and consequences of engine temp(much increased) can be pruned N C 5 is not inconsistent, but engine starting is not asked, due to optimization 4. Therefore search is limited to spark ignition(irregular). If steam(absent) w ere not observed from the beginning, it could be one of four possible data to be asked in order to evaluate N C 3 . Suppose that it is actually asked and the value absent is observed then the same situation is obtained as in case steam(absent) w ere observed from the beginning. Now, spark ignition(irregular) h a s t wo alternative causes whose necessary conditions are:
lights(dim) for the state electrical power(low) :
true for the state spark plugs used up(severe) :
The former is inconsistent with the observations (since it is known that the lights are normal) and thus all the part of the search space concerning electrical power(low) is pruned. The same happens in case lights(normal) were true but not yet observed: lightswould be asked.
Thus only one branch is left and this leads to determining the solution:
E 1 = f spark plugs mileage(more than 20000 km), 7 g
Experimental results
In the following we report some empirical results that have been obtained in testing the approach on the knowledge base in gure 1. In particular, the following three versions of Aid are considered:
PLAIN which does not use any compiled condition NEC which uses necessary conditions only NECSUF which uses both necessary and su cient conditions.
We p r o vide comparison results for two di erent cases (tables 2 and 3).
In the rst case (table 2) all relevant data are available from the beginning of the diagnostic process and thus no information has to be asked to the user. In the rst row, all of the observations are abnormal and therefore they belong to + . In this case, su cient conditions are relevant and thus there is a signi cant di erence between NEC and NECSUF: this is in particular due to the fact that exhaust smoke(black) is a su cient condition for oil consumption(much increased) and then search on the other cause of lack of oil(severe) is avoided by NECSUF, while it is not avoided by NEC. However, NEC avoids considering spark ignition(irreg) as an explanation of acceler response(delayed), because optimization 1 is applied, deleting acceler response(delayed) f r o m + since it is a necessary condition for high temp indicator(red).
In the second row there is only one observation in + , acceler response(delayed) the other ones can only be used for pruning, therefore there is no advantage in using su cient conditions, while the use of necessary conditions greatly improves the performances.
In the third row there is no great advantage in using compiled conditions: the absolute value of the running time of PLAIN is not high, and in fact there is no much useless search.
In the fourth row the use of optimization 1 is essential, since a large number of observations, all related to the same part of the model, is provided.
In the second case (table 3) only a limited set of data is available at the beginning and further information has to be asked during the diagnostic process. PLAIN, NEC and NECSUF are compared along two dimensions, the running times and the data asked to the user. PLAIN performs di erent cycles of the iterative procedure in section 2.3. Further data provided to it are the same asked by NECSUF such data are among the ones that are suggested as discriminating parameters by a v ery simple criterion, based on the number of solutions that predict a value for such data: if there are N explanations, those parameters on which a prediction is made by a n umberM of solutions, where M is as close as possible to N=2, are suggested. Such a criterion is quite fast, so that it does not have great in uence on the running time (and therefore the comparison on running time is not unfair for PLAIN) in particular, it is faster than the one mentioned is section 2.3 and does not rely on probabilistic knowledge, which is not used by NEC and NECSUF (therefore the comparison on the numberof required additional data is not unfair for NEC and NECSUF). acceler response(delayed) i s observed from the beginning (it has been chosen because it is the observation having the highest number of explanations, so it is the \most di cult" one). The relative performances of the three versions are similar to the previous case notice however that NEC needs one more datum than the other versions.
PLAIN
Other rows are relative to other possible answers that are given to the questions posed by NECSUF (high temp indicator is the rst datum which i s a s k ed then, depending on the answer, either exhaust smoke or lights is asked). In each case there is some advantage in using compiled conditions as in table 2, NECSUF is not better than NEC when further data are normality observations that do not have to be explained (third row). NECSUF is somewhat better than NEC as regards additional data, while it is not worse than PLAIN under this respect.
The approach has also been tested on a more complex model describing pathophysiological states of leprosis. Results similar to those illustrated in tables 2 and 3 have been obtained even in this case.
On the automatic synthesis of conditions
In this section we brie y describe how operational conditions can be automatically synthesized given a behavioral model. The synthesis process is inspired to the one described in 12] signi cant di erences are due to the di erent nature of compiled conditions, which in this paper have the goal of optimizing a speci c reasoning strategy on behavioral models.
Let us start by considering necessary conditions. Given an atom S in the model (the structure | predicate and values | of S will not be shown to simplify the notation), the necessary condition associated with it will be obtained in three parts:
A formula CA US E S S concerning the causes of S A formula M A N I F S containing the necessary manifestations of S For each necessary consequence S 0 of S, a formula CO NS E Q S S 0 , concerning the necessary consequences of S 0 .
Notice that necessary consequence (or manifestation) of a state S means a state (or manifestation) for which S itself is a direct cause, not in conjunction with anything else (context atom or state atom or abstracted condition).
Given a choice point S such t h a t S 1 , S 2 , : : : S n are the causes of S, the necessary condition to be evaluated when S i has to be used as an explanation of S is:
CA US E S Si^M A N I F Si^Ŝ For each ground state atom S, the formula CO NS E Q S S 0 can be synthesized using a backward propagation process in which:
{ if a state has no necessary consequences the formula is simply \true" { if S 0 is a necessary consequence of S, then CO NS E Q S S 0 Ŝ 00 CO NS E Q S 0 S 00^M A N I F S 0 this means, in particular, that in a one-pass backward propagation through the whole set of states, the CO NS E Qformulae for all states in the network can be computed.
For each ground state atom S the formula CA US E S S can be synthesized using a forward propagation process starting from initial states and contexts. Since disjunctions should not be included in the necessary conditions associated with nodes (see the discussion in section 4.1), each time a state S has multiple causes, the formula CA US E S S must simply be \true" (as in case it had no causes). Therefore:
{ each time S has no cause (it is an initial cause) or multiple causes, then C A U S E S S true { in case S has a single cause S 1^: : : S n^C1^: : : C m , then CA US E S S ĵ C j^î CA US E S Si^M A N I F Si^Ŝ
The formulae can thus be computed, for all nodes, in a one-pass forward propagation.
Notice that the propagation processes above terminate in a nite number of steps (linear in the number of nodes) since the network contains no cycles and there is no double recursion in the de nition of CO NS E Q and CA US E S . Acyclicity also allows us to prove by induction that the process above actually computes necessary conditions for entities in a model. Su cient conditions can be synthesized by exploiting their duality with respect to necessary conditions. Given a manifestation M, a variation of the above process can compute which are the states S that are necessary for M (this can be done as a side-e ect of the propagations above). Give n a s t a t e S, the su cient condition for S is the disjunction of the manifestations M for which S is necessary.
As regards the complexity of the compilation process, the focusing conditions can be synthesized very e ciently: the complexity o f t h e o verall process is in fact linear in the size of the model, if common parts of di erent conditions are not copied. In this way, also the space complexity of the process is linear in the size of the model.
Discussion and Comparison with Related Work
In the previous sections we discussed how abductive diagnosis can be focused using compiled knowledge, presenting empirical results supporting our approach. In particular, we use di erent t ypes of compiled knowledge to focus the overall diagnostic process (i.e., both candidate generation and discrimination, which are partially interleaved), preserving the completeness of the model-based approach. The approach p r e s e n ted in the paper has been experimented in the Aid architecture for abductive diagnosis. Aid is implemented in C-Prolog under the Unix operating system and uses several graphical interface tools (for knowledge acquisition, data acquisition and explanation) developed in C language in the OSF-Motif environment.
In this nal part of the paper we compare our approach to related ones. In the introduction we noticed that many di erent approaches to mitigate the complexity of model-based diagnosis have recently been proposed. In particular, many researchers suggested that operational (specialized) diagnostic knowledge can be derived from rst-principle models (in order to avoid two separate knowledge acquisition phases and to guarantee that the multiple knowledge bases are consistent). The approaches can be roughly classi ed in two groups:
O -line synthesis of a compiled diagnostic system: a heuristic diagnostic system is synthesized from the \deep" model, which is only used in this phase and can then be disregarded (see the seminal work in 4] and 1, 3 3 , 3 9 , 4 2 , 5 1 ]).
Approaches based on learning from previous experience. The idea in such a case is to cache the results of the diagnostic process (after a generalization step) so that when a similar problem has to be solved, the solution can be obtained without using the \deep" model (see the seminal work in 54] and 24, 36, 4 1 ]).
Our approach signi cantly departs from both groups above. The main di erence with respect to the rst group is the fact that we use the behavioral model during the diagnostic process and that we just compile focusing and pruning conditions. Therefore we h a ve all the advantages and capabilities of the model-based approach reducing the complexity of the computation of explanations. The idea of having o -line synthesis (generating a knowledge base that has not a full diagnostic coverage) but maintaining the deep models for \di cult" problems has been proposed in mdx-2 56] (and used also in other systems based on the same paradigm). The main di erence with respect to our approach is that such approaches aims at compiling diagnostic knowledge while we aim at compiling focusing knowledge (and thus, in mdx-2 it is not clear how the compiled knowledge base can focus reasoning on the deep one on cases that are not covered by the compiled model itself).
As regards the second group of approaches, we stressed the importance of computing pruning and focusing conditions rather than solution rules. The problem with solution rules (which are basically su cient conditions for solutions) is that it is not easy to generalize from the solution to one problem to rules which are useful also in other problems (this is due to the interaction and masking between multiple faults and to the basic \non-monotonicity" of diagnosis). As regards both groups, the overall diagnostic process is focused, and not only the process of generating explanations from a given set of data, making it possible to start from a single observed datum, subsequently acquiring in a focused way further data that make it possible to discriminate between its multiple explanations (as in the example in table 3).
The analysis above i s related to the recent debate on the role of knowledge compilation in model based reasoning 15, 29, 3 4 ] . Such a debate started with Davis' criticism to the use of knowledge compilation: he argued that compiling deep models into heuristic rules is useless since it is the content and not the form of a knowledge base which in uences the complexity of the reasoning process. The criticism is thus mainly directed to the possibility o f h a ving an e cient heuristic system with the capabilities of the \deep" one. Keller in his response 34] argued that the goal of knowledge compilation is also to change the content of a knowledge base and in this sense the approach can produce e cient, even if not complete, diagnostic systems which can solve the majority of the problems (the \typical" problems). A position which is similar to Keller's one has been recently expressed by Chandrasekaran in 3] who agreed on the point that a change in content is performed by k n o wledge compilers and that deep models are more robust than compiled ones (they can deal with more cases) while compiled models are useful when the same problem has to be solved more than once.
We partially agree and disagree with all the positions above. Our approach shows that the use of compiled conditions (which, per-se, correspond to partial knowledge) can signi cantly improve the performance of model-based diagnosis. In some sense in our approach w e compile the problem solving strategy used to solve diagnostic problems rather than compiling diagnostic knowledge. The strategy is embedded in the evaluation of necessary and su cient conditions and in the decisions that are taken given the result of such a n e v aluation. We thus agree with Davis that a simple change of the form of a knowledge base is not su cient however we d o not agree that knowledge compilation is tout-court useless or impossible. We agree with Keller that knowledge compilation can change the content o f a k n o wledge base however, while Keller (and Chandrasekaran and others) conceive knowledge compilation as an approach to derive specialized solution rules and thus they consider the possibility of generating problem solvers that use compiled knowledge as domain knowledge, we compile solution strategies. In this sense our compilation approach c hanges the content since it enriches the behavioral model with problem solving knowledge (in a di erent w ay, w e m a k e explicit some specialized strategy that can focus the diagnostic process).
The goals of the approach to focusing we presented have some similarities with the work on abductive classi cation in 31]. The basic type of knowledge used in such approaches is a set of associations between diagnostic hypotheses and their manifestations. This descriptions, however, are augmented with information which are used to focus the abductive process (i.e., the process of determining a -minimal -set of hypotheses that accounts for the observations). Rules for computing a plausibility degree are associated with each hypothesis they can play the role of rule-out knowledge when the plausibility degree is low. Our approach i s signi cantly di erent since the type of models that are used are di erent ( w e h a ve more complex behavioral models rather than associations between faults and their manifestations) and, as a consequence, the type of reasoning we perform is di erent. Moreover, we compile focusing knowledge automatically from the deep models while in abductive classi cation the ty p e o f k n o wledge which i s u s e d has more of a heuristic nature (in some cases it is knowledge acquired from the domain expert).
As noticed in the introduction, the use of compiled knowledge is not the only way to focus model-based diagnosis. The probabilistic approach proposed by de Kleer 18] provides signi cant a d v antages and the same information used to focus the generation of explanations is also used for measurement selection. There are some signi cant di erences between our approach and de Kleer's one: we have completely di erent goals, since we aim at maintaining the completeness of the problem solving strategy while probabilistic approaches compute only the most probable diagnoses 5 . Moreover, we i n tegrate (at least in part) candidate generation and discrimination and we do not require fault probabilities.
The goal of our approach is closer to the goal of systems that use hierarchical models or structural focusing. However, although the goals are conceptually similar (excluding the parts of the model which are not relevant for solving the problem under examination and thus avoiding useless search) the means used for achieving them are completely di erent. Indeed, we believe that our approach can be pro tably combined with the use of hierarchical modeling and hierarchical approaches to model based diagnosis.
It is worth relating our approach to the complexity results on abduction mentioned in the introduction 2, 50]. Such results are worst-case analyses and of course we do not try to improve on them. However, on the one hand 2] mentions that rule-out knowledge can be used as a mitigating factor in practical cases. On the other hand, the possibility of acquiring new observations changes the problem, introducing an additional dimension other than computational costs: the number of additional observations (and, possibly, their individual cost).
Our approach combines both ideas in particular, it uses compiled knowledge as rule-out knowledge, and it acquires new observations in order to use the compiled knowledge.
The expected bene t of the approach, when fully applicable (see below), is high because of the following reasons.
The complexity of the compilation phase is low (see section 5)
The additional costs associated with choice points are expected to be low in practical cases. In fact, given a choice point S with alternative direct explanations S 1 : : : S n , the typical case is the one where only one S i is true (i.e. the average number of true states should be close to 1), since the states represent abnormal conditions. If each other S j is false, the necessary conditions associated with them are typically false and they can be usually shown to be false evaluating a small number of operational atoms. Then the computational costs are low, and the number of additional observations is low a s w ell (in the test cases it resulted the same as the number of additional observations needed for a-posteriori discrimination).
A nal important notice regards the applicability of the approach. Of course, the approach is only useful if signi cant knowledge can be compiled for a knowledge base (and this is expected to be false for worst cases in the complexity analyses).
One reason for not being able to synthesize necessary conditions is the lack of complete relations, in the sense de ned in section 2.1. This is in accordance with the observation in 2] that knowledge of the right k i n d (rule-out knowledge) is needed. Viewing a relation as complete or incomplete may be a matter of abstraction (i.e. abstracting some quali cation which is not explicitly mentioned and is assumed to be true) notice however that the quali cation problem, i.e. the problem of representing and reasoning with a potentially endless list of exceptions to rules, tends to reduce for fault models that state the consequences of faults: e.g. if a wire is broken, then there is de nitely no voltage at its ends a lamp is de nitely o if it is broken or there is no voltage applied to it.
Notice that our approach also relies on su cient conditions, which do not rely on complete relations, but rather on the existence of observations that admit only one (direct) explanation (a similar approach, based on the concept of essential explanations, has been advocated in 25]). Such observations may be scarce in some domains but not in other ones (in the example above, a negative result in testing the wire has the only explanation that it is broken, if the testing equipment is assumed to be reliable).
